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Introduction 
The bacteria Vibrio vulnificus is a nat­
urally occurring organism in estuarine 
waters and is found in an unknown pro-
portion of eastern oysters, Crassostrea 
virginica, harvested from the Gulf of 
Mexico (hereafter, the Gulf). The pres­
ence of Vibrio vulnificus is highly cor­
related with water temperature, and vir­
tually all Gulf-harvested oysters contain 
some concentration of it in the warmer 
summer months (McQuaid, 1997). As 
noted by Corcoran (1998) in the Nutri-
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ABSTRACT—California, in response to 
health concerns, initiated a program on 1 
March 1991 which required anyone selling 
eastern oysters, Crassostrea virginica, from 
the Gulf of Mexico area to notify potential 
consumers that there was a risk in consum­
ing them raw. This mandatory warning, 
followed shortly thereafter by a similar 
warning in other states, including Louisiana 
and Florida, received extensive press cover-
age throughout the country and particularly 
in the Gulf area. This paper examines the 
extent to which the demand for Gulf-area 
oysters has been reduced as a result of man­
datory warning labels and negative public­
ity. In general, the results suggest that since 
1991 the “summer” dockside price has been 
reduced by about 50% as a result of warn­
ing labels and associated negative publicity, 
while the “winter” dockside price has been 
reduced by about 30%. 
tion Action Healthletter: “[e]very year, 
more than 50 people become ill and at 
least 10 die after eating uncooked Gulf 
Coast oysters that are contaminated 
with Vibrio vulnificus bacteria.” Most 
of these illnesses and deaths occur be-
tween May and October. 
California, in response to this health 
concern, initiated a program on 1 March 
1991 which required anyone selling 
Gulf oysters to notify potential consum­
ers that the “consumption of raw oysters 
can cause illness and death among 
people with liver disease, chronic ill­
nesses, or weakened immune systems” 
(Liddle, 1991). California’s mandatory 
warning received extensive coverage 
in newspapers (and the trade literature) 
both there and across the country and 
particularly in the Gulf region.1 
In a further step to promote public 
safety, the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) in 1994 proposed 
banning consumption of raw oysters 
from the Gulf from April through Oc­
tober when Vibrio vulnificus was most 
prevalent. After “heavy pressure from 
the Gulf oyster industry and members 
of Congress from Louisiana and other 
Gulf states,” the FDA backed away from 
its initial proposal and instead opted 
for a “public awareness campaign” to 
notify and educate those people at risk 
(McQuaid, 1997). 
The primary goal of this paper is to 
examine the extent to which the demand 
for Gulf oysters has been reduced as a 
result of the mandatory warning labels 
and associated media attention and to 
examine the impact on consumer wel-
1 Subsequently, other states—most notably Lou­
isiana and Florida—have enacted mandatory warn­
ing label programs similar to that of California. 
fare associated with further regulation 
of the harvesting sector. A secondary 
goal of the paper is to analyze the 
impacts of other factors, such as the 
quantity harvested and income, on the 
demand for Gulf oysters. To accomplish 
these goals, an overview of the oyster 
industry is presented here, followed by 
a review of relevant literature. Then, the 
model used for the analysis is specified, 
and the data and estimation issues are 
briefly examined. The empirical results 
are then presented, and the paper con­
cludes with a discussion of the implica­
tions of the findings. 
Industry Overview 
The U.S. oyster industry operates on 
both the U.S. east and west coasts. The 
primary oyster species harvested on the 
east coast (i.e. Atlantic and Gulf), the 
eastern oyster, produced average annual 
landings of about 31 million pounds 
during 1981–97 with an associated 
$77 million dockside value (NMFS2). 
Annual landings of Pacific oysters, 
Crassostrea gigas, the primary west 
coast species, averaged about 9 million 
pounds valued at $18 million (dockside) 
during 1981–97. 
Gulf oyster production averaged 
20 million pounds annually during 
1981–97, or about 60% of the total east-
ern oyster production. Louisiana, the 
primary producer there, accounted for 
almost 60% of the Gulf output, while 
Texas accounted for an additional 20%. 
Chesapeake Bay, once the nation’s 
largest oyster source, has seen produc­
tion fall sharply since the early 1980’s 
2 NMFS Commercial Fisheries Landings data 
compiled by the Fisheries Statistics and Econom­
ics Division, Office of Science and Technology 
available at http://www.st.nmfs.gov/commercial. 
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Figure 1.—Annual dockside oyster prices (current) in the Gulf and Chesapeake regions, 1981–97 (NMFS text footnote 2). 
due to habitat degradation, overfishing, 
and disease (Rothschild et al., 1994). 
Then averaging close to 17 million 
pounds annually, the Chesapeake’s 
output fell more than 90% to about 
1.5 million pounds annually during 
1995–97 (NMFS2). 
Prior to 1991, annual dockside Gulf 
and Chesapeake oyster prices tended to 
“mirror” one another, with annual price 
differentials rarely exceeding $0.40 per 
pound (NMFS2) and an average price 
differential equal to only $0.26 per 
pound (Fig. 1). Since 1991, however, 
the prices in those regions have become 
decidedly more distinct, with the aver-
age annual price differential exceed­
ing $1.00 per pound. The large price 
differential since 1991 provides some 
preliminary evidence that the manda­
tory warning labels and media attention 
may have impacted demand and, hence, 
price of the Gulf product. 
Theoretical Basis 
and Literature Review 
Strand (1999) reviewed the literature 
pertaining to consumer behavior with 
respect to food-borne contamination 
events, concluding that the information 
related to an event, which is subjectively 
evaluated by consumers, is critical to 
perception formation. He further sug­
gested that uncertainty contained in 
the information can also be critical in 
perception formation. Finally, Strand 
suggested that the credibility of the in-
formation depends on its source. 
Perceptions, of course, can alter 
consumer choice. Strand (1999) fur­
ther concluded that consumers react to 
negative news by reducing demand for 
the product and/or by taking defensive 
actions to lower the level of health risk. 
Furthermore, as a result of uncertainty 
(e.g. uncertainty of the marketing chan­
nels through which they obtain their 
consumables), consumers may reduce 
demand even though there is no sci­
entifically supported risk to them from 
normal consumption. Finally, Strand 
(1999) suggested that changes in 
demand owing to reports of persistent 
toxic compounds (like DDT) appear 
to be a reaction to cumulative news 
reports, and while the effects associ­
ated with news will decay over time, the 
decay is slow. 
Strand’s synthesis of the literature 
provides several insights that are rel­
evant to this study. First, one might hy­
pothesize that consumers have reacted 
to the negative publicity concerning the 
consumption of raw Gulf oysters by re­
ducing demand for the raw product and/ 
or taking defensive actions to lower the 
level of health risk. Such actions may 
include increasing demand for the pro­
cessed product vis-a-vis the raw product 
or by reducing consumption only in the 
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“summer” months when health risks (in 
terms of mortality) from the consump­
tion of raw oysters are greatest. 
Second, uncertainty is likely to be a 
major factor in determining the change 
in demand for Gulf oysters. The uncer­
tainty is inherent in both the information 
presented to the consumer as well as un­
certainty presented to the consumer as 
to whether he/she possesses the health 
characteristics (i.e. liver disease, chronic 
illness, or a weakened immune system) 
that would make the consumption of 
raw oysters “risky.” 
Third, one could argue that the change 
in demand for Gulf oysters is analogous 
to Strand’s (1999) discussion regarding 
changes in demand for food products 
resulting from reports of persistent toxic 
compounds. Specifically, while Vibrio 
vulnificus is not a toxic compound, like 
some such compounds, it is persistent in 
nature and continues to receive adverse 
publicity several years after the initia­
tion of warning labels. 
Model Specification 
For purposes of analysis, the demand 
for Gulf oysters is specified as: 
PGt = β0 + β1VU Lt + 
β2SEASt + β3QG t + 
β4INCt + β5(SEAS*VUL)t + (1) 
β6(QG*SEAS)t + 
β7 LATXt + β8LPGt + ∈t 
where PGt denotes the deflated Gulf 
oyster dockside price in quarter t, ex-
pressed in dollars per pound of meats 
(1997 Consumer Price Index equals 
base); VULt is a binary variable used 
to “capture” the change in demand due 
to warning labels and associated media 
attention (equal to 0 before 1991 and 1 
thereafter)3; SEASt is a binary variable 
3 While many studies which evaluate the impact 
of information on consumer demand quantify 
the amount of information available at regular 
intervals (Swartz and Strand, 1981; Johnson, 
1988) or the amount of cumulative information 
(Brown and Schrader, 1990), the use of such 
procedures were, for several reasons, impracti­
cal with respect to the current study. First, the 
information is received from both warning labels 
and the print media, and any attempt to isolate 
these two factors would be problematic. Second, 
a large percentage of raw oyster consumption 
used to “capture” seasonality in the 
demand for Gulf oysters equal to 0 for 
the months April through September, 
(i.e. the 2nd and 3rd quarters) and 1 for 
all other months, (i.e. the 1st and 4th 
quarters); QGt denotes the Gulf oyster 
harvest, expressed in millions of pounds 
of meats, in quarter t; INCt denotes the 
U.S. real disposable income in quarter t, 
expressed in billions of dollars; LATXt 
denotes the share of Gulf oyster produc­
tion accounted for by Louisiana and 
Texas in quarter t; LPGt denotes the de­
flated Gulf price lagged one quarter; and 
∈t denotes the error term. Parameters to 
be estimated range from β0 to β8. 
The equation, as specified, is price 
dependent. This reflects the fact that 
production in the Gulf tends to be 
determined, to a large degree, by the 
availability of oysters which, in turn, is 
largely dictated by environmental influ­
ences, particularly in the short run.4 
The variable VULt was included to 
“capture” any decrease in demand as-
3 (continued) occurs in the away-from-home 
market, and much of the information appears to 
occur in trade journals. Hence, one would need to 
isolate the impact related to information in trade 
journals from that of the more common news 
media. Finally, most studies that have evaluated 
the impact of negative information on demand 
are based on products for which the duration was 
of only a limited period of time. With respect to 
the impact of Vibrio vulnificus on the demand 
for Gulf product, the publicity is of longer or 
continuing duration. 
4 A reviewer suggested that, because of leasing 
activities in Louisiana and Texas, quantity har­
vested may not be exogenous to the system. To 
examine this issue, a vector autogressive model 
between Gulf price (PG) and quantity (QG) was 
estimated as follows: 
QGt = α0 + α1QGt–1 + α2PGt + α3PGt–1 + ξ1t 
PGt = β0 + β1PGt–1 + β2QGt + β3QGt–1 + ξ2t 
where QGt–1 represents the Gulf landings lagged 
one period and PGt–1 is the Gulf price lagged one 
period. The Gulf oyster price is said to be block 
exogenous with respect to Gulf landings if the 
elements in Gulf price are of no help in improv­
ing the forecast of Gulf landings based only on 
lagged values of PG. The null hypothesis is “PG 
is not exogenous to QG” which is equivalent to 
α2 = α3 = 0. The test statistic follows a chi square 
distribution with one degree of freedom. The 
associated chi square statistic of 0.01 (signifi­
cance level is 3.84) at the 5% significance level 
implies that PG is not exogenous to QG. In con­
trast, the test statistic of 12.56 (significance level 
is 3.84) implies that QG is exogenous to PG. 
These results agree with the hypothesis that cur-
rent Gulf landings contribute significantly to the 
improvement of the forecasted price based only 
on lagged prices. However, current and lagged 
prices do not statistically improve the forecasted 
landings based only on lagged landing values. 
sociated with warning labels and media 
attention while the variable SEASt was 
used to “capture” seasonal variation in 
demand. Since the incidence of Vibrio 
is temperature dependent and is higher 
in the warmer months of the year, it is 
further hypothesized that the impact 
of VULt may vary by season with the 
impact on demand being greater in the 
“summer” months. To account for the 
possible variation in impact by season, 
an interaction term between SEASt and 
VULt is included in equation 1. 
It is anticipated that price in quarter 
t responds inversely to changes in Gulf 
harvest (QGt) and positively to changes 
in income (INCt). Furthermore, given 
the interaction between harvest and 
season (QG*SEAS)t, the response in 
price to a change in the quantity har­
vested is permitted to vary by season. 
Louisiana and Texas, as noted, gen­
erally account for the majority of Gulf 
oyster production. There appears to be a 
premium attached to the price of oysters 
harvested from these two states, perhaps 
due to a larger average size. Hence, one 
would expect that the average Gulf price 
is positively related to the share of pro­
duction derived from these two states. 
The variable LATXt is included in 
equation 1 to “capture” the price effect 
resulting from product heterogeneity 
across states. 
The variable LPGt is used to model 
inertia in the change in dockside price 
(PGt) to changes in exogenous vari­
ables. The value of β8 is expected to fall 
between 0 and 1 with a value approach­
ing 0 indicating instantaneous adjust­
ment in price to changes in the value 
of exogenous variables, while a value 
approaching 1 suggests a high degree 
of inertia. 
Finally, substitute products are often 
entered as exogenous variables in de­
mand models of this nature. One would 
hypothesize that oysters produced in 
other regions of the country might con­
stitute substitutes for the Gulf product. 
Chesapeake oysters, given the similarity 
in the type of oyster produced and the 
geographic relation, were considered 
a potential substitute product, a priori. 
Initial inclusion of Chesapeake produc­
tion in the Gulf demand equation did 
not prove to be successful and, hence 
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the variable was not included in the final 
version of the model discussed in the 
following sections.5 
Data and Estimation Issues 
Data Issues 
The Gulf dockside demand model 
developed in the previous section was 
estimated with quarterly data for the 
1981–97 period. Where appropriate 
(i.e. prices and income), the data were 
deflated using the 1997 Consumer Price 
Index. Some summary statistics for 
the variables included in the model are 
presented in Table 1. The deflated Gulf 
oyster price averaged $2.63 per pound, 
with the post 1990 price ($2.13 per 
pound) being nearly 30% less than the 
pre 1991 price ($2.98 per pound). The 
quantity harvested averaged 5.2 million 
pounds per quarter during the period of 
analysis, with the pre 1991 quarterly 
production (5.4 million pounds) av­
eraging about 8% more than the post 
1990 quarterly production (4.9 million 
pounds).6 
In general, little price variation was 
evident during the 1981–97 period 
when examined on a seasonal basis, 
even though production during the 
5 For comparison purposes, the model that 
includes Chesapeake production as an explana­
tory variable is included in the table that provides 
empirical results (Table 2). 
6 Much of the difference in pre and post 1990 
production can be attributed to abnormally low 
production in Louisiana in 1991 and 1992. Low 
production in those years reflects massive oyster 
mortalities from excessive rainfall and, hence, 
lower salinity. 
“winter” season, which averaged 6.1 
million pounds per quarter, exceeded 
the production during the “summer” 
season, which averaged 4.28 million 
pounds per quarter, by about 40%. 
Since 1991, “winter” season production 
has averaged 5.7 million pounds per 
quarter compared to 4.2 million pounds 
per quarter in the “summer” season. 
Estimation Issues 
The lagged dockside price (LPGt), 
as noted, was included in the analysis, 
based on the premise that the response 
in price to a change in an exogenous 
variable may not be completed in that 
quarter in which the change in the exog­
enous variable occurred (i.e. there exists 
some inertia in the change in price). As­
suming a geometric lag structure, this 
inertia, can be expressed as : 
Yt = α + β (Xt + wXt–1 + 
w2Xt–2 + ...) + ∈t (2) 
where w is the lagged weight (0<w<1) 
which declines at a geometric rate over 
time. As specified, equation 2 is difficult 
to estimate due to the infinite series of 
lagged regressors. 
As shown by Madalla (1977) and 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991), equation 
2 can be rewritten as: 
Yt = α(1–w) + wYt–1 + 
βXt + (∈t – w ∈t–1) (3) 
Expressed in this manner, the geometric 
lag model can be easily estimated, given 
the finite series of the lagged variable 
(i.e. Yt–1) . 
The implications associated with 
equation 3 are twofold. First, all past 
values of the exogenous variable (Xt) 
are captured in the endogenous variable 
(Yt) lagged one period with impact of a 
change in Xt on Yt decaying at a geomet­
ric rate over time. Second, lagging the 
dependent variable results in the intro­
duction of serial correlation of the error 
term, assuming ∈t in equation 2 does not 
exhibit an autocorrelation pattern. 
Several methods have been pro-
posed for estimating the geometric 
lag structured model in the presence 
of serial correlation. The most popular 
technique, and the one that is used in 
the current analysis, is the instrumental 
variable approach whereby an estimate 
of the lagged dependent variable is 
generated by regressing its value against 
the lagged values of the exogenous vari­
ables in the model. Then, the model is 
estimated using a maximum likelihood 
procedure. 
Given the structure of a geometric lag 
model, it is useful to identify the long-
run impact associated with a permanent 
change in the level of an exogenous 
variable. Madalla (1977) shows that this 
impact is equal to β /(1–w). Hence, as 
the value for w increases (0 < w < 1), the 
greater will be the amount of time which 
expires before the full impact of a one-
time change in an exogenous variable is 
recognized. This, in turn, implies that 
the difference between the immediate 
impact (β) and long-run impact (β/(1– 
w)) increases in relation to an increasing 
value of the lagged weight (w). 
Empirical ResultsTable 1.—Summary statistics pertaining to the Gulf of Mexico oyster demand model. 
Variable Overall mean1 “Winter” mean “Summer” mean Table 2 summaries the regression re-
1981–97 
PG ($/lb) 2.63 (0.81) 2.59 (0.83) 2.66 (0.80) 
QG (Mill lbs) 5.20 (1.91) 6.11 (2.08) 4.28 (1.17) 
INC ($ bill) 4,905.7 (588.0) 4,908.6 (593.3) 4,902.8 (591.6) 
LATX (%) 0.77 (0.10) 0.74 (0.09) 0.79 (0.10) 
1981–90 
PG ($/lb) 2.98 (0.82) 2.93 (0.87) 3.02 (0.79) 
QG (Mill lbs) 5.38 (2.20) 6.40 (2.48) 4.36 (1.27) 
INC ($ bill) 4,524.3 (442.2) 4,527.1 (447.8) 4,521.4 (448.1) 
LATX (%) 0.76 (0.11) 0.73 (0.12) 0.78 (0.11) 
1991–97 
PG ($/lb) 2.13 (0.46) 2.11 (0.44) 2.15 (0.49) 
QG (Mill lbs) 4.94 (1.40) 5.71 (1.31) 4.16 (1.05) 
INC ($ bill) 5,450.5 (228.6) 5,453.5 (238.3) 5,447.5 (227.5) 
LATX (%) 0.78 (0.08) 0.75 (0.05) 0.81 (0.10) 
1 Standard errors of means are given in parentheses. 
sults associated with the Gulf dockside 
demand model. The estimated param­
eters, in general, agreed with prior ex­
pectations and, with few exceptions, all 
estimated parameters were significant at 
the 90% confidence level. Furthermore, 
the estimated model explained almost 
90% of the variation in the deflated Gulf 
dockside price (Table 2, Fig. 2). 
Overall, increased information re­
lated to Vibrio vulnificus was found 
to significantly influence the demand 
(price) for Gulf oysters. Specifically, 
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Figure 2.—Actual and predicted quarterly dockside Gulf oyster price (deflated), 1981–97. 
the warning labels and associated media Table 2.—Estimated parameters and standard errors associated with the Gulf of Mexico oyster demand model. 
attention (VULt) resulted in an immedi- Estimated1, 2 Standard Estimated1, 3 Standard 
ate reduction in the “summer” dockside Variable parameter error parameter error 
price by $0.93 per pound compared to a 
reduction in the “winter” price of $0.72 
per pound. These reductions, however, 
reflect only the initial impact. The fact 
that the estimate of β8, equal to 0.553, 
falls between 0 and 1 implies that as one 
moves further away from the date that 
warning labels were initially mandated, 
the greater the absolute value of the 
magnitude of the policy variable. 
In the long-run, the impact of warn­
ing labels was estimated to result in a 
decline in the “summer” dockside price 
equal to $2.07 per pound and a “winter” 
reduction in price equal to $1.60 per 
pound. The actual “summer” price in 
1997 equaled $2.16 while the actual 
winter price equaled $2.22, suggest­
ing that the “summer” price has been 
Intercept 0.669 0.537 0.349 0.606 
VULt –0.929* 0.174 –0.955* 0.175 
SEASt –0.624* 0.203 –0.741* 0.227 
QGt –0.217* 0.036 –0.217* 0.036 
QCt 0.027 0.024 
INCt 0.372E-3* 0.134E-3 0.427E-3* 0.142E-3 
(SEAS * VUL)t 0.213** 0.114 0.299* 0.137 
(QG * SEAS)t 0.109* 0.036 0.111* 0.036 
LATXt 0.165 0.416 0.209 0.417 
LPGt 0.553* 0.076 0.557* 0.076 
1 *
 = statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level; ** = statistically significant at the α = 0.10 level. 
2 Model estimated without Chesapeake landings (QCt) as an exogenous variable; adj. R2=0.88. 
3 Model estimated with Chesapeake landings (QCt) as an exogenous variable; adj. R2 = 0.88. 
reduced nearly 50% as a result of the 
warning labels and negative publicity, 
while the “winter” price has been re­
duced by about 30%.7 
7 One could hypothesize that the impact of warn­
ing labels and the associated negative publicity 
7 (continued) decays at some rate with the pas-
sage of time as consumers either forget about the 
negative publicity or overcome initial fears. To 
examine whether this was the case, the analysis 
was also conducted for the 1981–93 period. In 
general, the parameter estimates varied only 
marginally (e.g. β1 = –0.929 and β5 = 0.265), 
suggesting that the decay in the initial impact is, 
at most, minor. 
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With respect to the Gulf land­
ings (QGt), the results suggest that a 
1,000,000 pound increase (decrease) in 
“summer” harvest results in an immedi­
ate $0.22 decrease (increase) in price. 
An equivalent change in the “winter” 
harvest, by comparison, results in an 
immediate inverse price response of 
only $0.11 per pound, or about half 
of that estimated for the “summer” 
season. In the long-run, a 1,000,000 
pound increase (decrease) in “summer” 
harvest was found to result in a $0.48 
decrease (increase) in the Gulf dockside 
price, while a 1,000,000 pound increase 
(decrease) in the “winter” harvest was 
estimated to result in a price decrease 
(increase) of $0.24 per pound. 
With respect to seasonality, the re­
sults suggest that the demand for Gulf 
oysters in the “winter” season exceeds 
demand in the “summer” season, with 
the expected price differential equaling 
about $0.07 per pound ceteris paribus, 
prior to 1991.8 After 1991, in associa­
tion with the warning labels and media 
attention, the difference in demand 
between the “winter” and “summer” 
seasons resulted in an expected price 
differential of $0.21 per pound. 
Income, as indicated in Table 2, was 
found to significantly influence the Gulf 
oyster dockside demand. Overall, the 
results suggest that a $100 billion dollar 
increase in real disposable income 
would result in an immediate $0.04 
increase in price and a price increase 
equal to $0.08 increase in the long run. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
A model was developed and analyzed 
to examine the impact of mandatory 
warning labels and the associated nega­
tive publicity on dockside price of Gulf 
oysters. Results suggest that the impact 
has been significant. Specifically, the re­
sults suggest that the “summer” price has 
been reduced by about 50% as a result of 
the warning labels and associated nega­
tive publicity, while the “winter” price 
has been reduced by about 30%. 
8 As indicated in Table 1, the observed ‘summer” 
price exceeded the “winter” price by $0.05 per 
pound prior to 1991. Given the results of the 
current analysis, it appears as though the higher 
observed “summer” price reflects a lower level 
of production. 
The results developed in this paper 
can be used to assess the impacts of 
various policy measures. For example, 
the FDA, as noted in the introduction, 
proposed a restriction on sales of raw 
oysters for consumption from April to 
October when the Vibrio vulnificus bac­
teria is most prevalent in Gulf waters. 
From a welfare economics perspective, 
such a ban would lead to a net increase 
in the welfare of society if the benefits 
of taking action (i.e. prohibiting raw 
oyster consumption) exceed the costs. 
Benefits reflect, primarily, the reduction 
in premature deaths and illnesses. Costs, 
on the other hand, reflect the reduction 
in consumer and producer welfare (i.e. 
surplus) which would be incurred as a 
result of the ban. 
As noted by Corcoran (1998), at 
least 10 people die annually from the 
consumption of raw Gulf oysters, while 
more than 50 become ill (an average 
of 17 individuals died annually during 
1996–98). While assigning an economic 
value to a statistical life is problematic 
(Kuchler and Golan, 1999), recent em­
pirical work, based on labor market 
analysis, suggests that the value of a 
statistical life, expressed in 1997 dol­
lars, falls in the neighborhood of about 
$4–8 million (Viscusi, 1993, and Moore 
and Viscusi, 1988 provide details).9 This 
suggests that the benefits from the pro-
posed ban, excluding the reduction in 
illnesses, would approximate $40– 80 
million annually. 
An “upper bound” estimate of the 
loss in consumer welfare associated 
with such a ban can be generated under 
the assumption that production is equal 
to zero in those months that would be 
impacted by the proposed ban.10 
Based upon 1997 quarterly data and 
estimates, an “upper bound” estimate 
9 The value of a life refers to the amount of 
money an individual is willing to trade for a 
small change in his or her probability of survival 
(Blomquist, 2001) 
10 Only an “upper bound” estimate of the loss 
in consumer welfare can be derived, because 
an unknown percentage of the “summer” season 
harvest is currently processed, which is not sub­
ject to the proposed ban. Furthermore, if the ban 
were to be implemented, the demand for pro­
cessed product would likely increase resulting in 
a greater proportion of the harvested “summer” 
product being directed towards the processing 
sector. 
of the loss in consumer surplus in 1997 
from the proposed ban would have been 
about $6,500,000 based on the 1997 
dockside value of $21,200,000 (April 
through October). 
While cost information on the Gulf 
oyster harvesting sector is insufficient to 
accurately estimate the loss in producer 
welfare associated with the proposed 
ban, it is obviously just a small frac­
tion of the $21,200,000 in revenues 
generated during the April through Oc­
tober 1997 period. This fraction and the 
$6,500,000 loss in consumer welfare is 
considerably less than the $40–80 mil-
lion annual benefits that would be forth-
coming as a result of the ban. Hence, 
one could conclude that the welfare of 
society would be enhanced if the eating 
of raw Gulf oysters were seasonally 
restricted. 
The FDA, as previously indicated, 
chose not to institute a ban on the con­
sumption of raw Gulf oysters in the 
“summer” season, opting instead for a 
“public awareness campaign” to notify 
and educate those consumers at risk. As 
noted by Henson and Caswell (1999: 
591), policy interventions by govern­
ments reflect an “...outcome of a complex 
trade-off between alternative demands 
that reflect the interests of the different 
groups that might be affected. In the case 
of food policy this will include consum­
ers, food manufacturers, food retailers, 
and farmers, both at home and abroad, as 
well as government itself and taxpayers.” 
Whether the alternative strategy (i.e. the 
awareness and education program), de-
rived via this complex trade-off between 
alternative demands, proves to be as suc­
cessful as a seasonal restriction would be 
has yet to be determined. 
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